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ABSTRACT 
Part of the way venture capitalists add value to portfolio firms is by obtaining and 
transferring information about senior managers across firms over time.  Information transfer occurs 
on a significant scale and takes place both among a single venture capitalist’s portfolio firms and 
between different venture capitalists’ firms via a network of venture capitalists, which venture 
capitalists use to locate and relocate managers. 
We collect and analyze survey data on the operation of this human resource network. 
Theoretical and empirical analyses indicate that cross-sectional differences among portfolio firms 
are associated with differences in the intensity with which venture capitalists network. The 
observable factors relevant in explaining the intensity with which venture capitalists network 
include: 1) the value of the information transmitted though the network, 2) the riskiness of the 
activities of the portfolio firms, 3) the size of the venture capital fund, 4) the degree of  difficulty in 
enticing executives to manage portfolio firms, and 5) the reputation of the venture capitalist for 
successfully recycling managers. We show that each of these factors reflects the costs and benefits 
to venture capitalists of participating in the network.  
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1.  Introduction 
The crucial role of small businesses in creating jobs and spurring innovation gives special 
importance to the financing of growth companies. The central problem of financing small, growing 
businesses is to find a way for outsiders to supply equity profitably to entrepreneurs with limited 
track records in the financial system. Small, growing businesses often need to invest quickly, long 
ahead of the expected stream of profits, and in a quantity far greater than their capacity to issue 
debt. But the risks faced by suppliers of equity can be prohibitive in the face of substantial adverse-
selection problems in identifying worthwhile firms in which to invest, and the need to monitor and 
control the use of funds by entrepreneurs, to ensure that outsiders’ funds are employed to the 
advantage of stockholders rather than entrepreneurs. The combination of back-loaded profits, 
limited debt capacity, large growth opportunities, and adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems 
in the equity market make the provision of outside equity as difficult as it is important.  
For the past four decades in the United States, venture capital funds (or, more generally, 
private equity funds)1 have been an important solution to this problem. Venture capital has been 
very successful in funding some of the most dynamic American enterprises, including Microsoft, 
Cisco, Intel, Compaq, Federal Express, Apple Computers, Genentech, and Amazon.com. About 
30% of the companies that go public in the US received venture capital resources [Gompers and 
Lerner (1997)]. These results become even more impressive when we consider that the amount of 
capital raised by institutional venture capitalists in the United States between 1978 and 1997 has 
averaged less than $3 billion per year and never exceeded $7 billion until 1997 (that compared with 
an average $8 trillion GDP and nearly $1 trillion in gross domestic fixed investment).  
                                                 
1 In this article, venture capital and private equity are used as synonyms, but typically venture capital connotes the 
financing of new products, while private equity is a broader category including all types of equity investments 
(traditional venture capital investments, industry consolidation, leveraged buyouts, etc.). 
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Most studies of the structure and function of venture capital funds have focused on the 
structure of private equity funds (their financial design), and their role in solving information and 
control problems for portfolio firms – i.e., the role of private equity funds in allocating control 
rights, and in ameliorating adverse selection and moral hazard problems [Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1994), Amit, Glosten, and Muller (1990), Chan (1983), Cornelli and Yosha (1997), Hellman 
(1998), Marx (1998), Repullo e Suarez (2000)]. In these papers, venture capital is viewed as a 
financial contract designed to give investors the necessary control, remunerate them for the high 
risk they assume, and solve incentive problems. Sahlman (1990) describes venture capital as an 
institution shaped to screen projects and provide monitoring [Gompers (1995) and Lerner (1995) 
present empirical analyses]. By being actively involved within the firms they fund, venture 
capitalists have access to information and mechanisms that enable them to deal with adverse 
selection and moral hazard. As a consequence, venture capitalists can provide financing to young 
businesses that otherwise would not receive external resources [Barry (1994)]. These various 
studies all view venture capital funding from the perspective of the financial problem solved by 
venture capitalists, namely permitting entrepreneurial companies to access external equity funding. 
Does venture capital also bring non-financial benefits? There is anecdotal evidence that 
because venture capitalists frequently specialize in a particular technology or stage of development 
they can offer strategic, technical, and commercial guidance [Barry (1994), Byers (1997), Bygrave 
and Timmons (1992), Sahlman (1990), Sapienza (1992)]. However, to date, little research has been 
devoted to quantifying the non-financial benefits of venture capital. 
A notable exception is the paper by Hellmann and Puri (2002), who show that venture 
capital influences the internal organization of portfolio firms. In particular, they show that venture-
backed companies are faster to bring in outsiders as CEOs, and that this effect is more noticeable at 
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the very early stage.2 The authors do not explore the theoretical foundations of why private equity 
finance should bring such advantages. 
Our study describes a theoretical framework in which venture capital acts as a human 
resources management mechanism, accompanied by corroborating empirical evidence. The 
theoretical foundations of our framework are simple: Good management is important to the success 
of all firms, but it is essential for the success of young, fast-growing enterprises pursuing risky 
investment strategies. Managerial resources often are particularly scarce in young, growing firms; 
the most innovative entrepreneurs are not necessarily endowed with talents as managers. And, as 
the newly organized firm grows, its human resource needs become greater and more complex. 
Thus, it is often the case that realizing the potential of an entrepreneurial firm depends on its 
capacity to recruit high-level managers.  
Venture capitalists may have a comparative advantage in recruiting management for 
portfolio firms by virtue of their “networking” capabilities and access to private information about 
managerial talent based on their previous experiences with managers. The extent of that 
comparative advantage may depend on various attributes of the venture capitalist and the portfolio 
firms. Different financiers may have different skills and resources for solving the human resource 
problems of portfolio firms. And portfolio firms may differ according to the difficulties they face in 
identifying and attracting the right managers to the firm.  
Very risky firms may find it harder to attract managers who are risk-averse (and who, 
therefore, may prefer a safe job in an established firm to a risky job in the portfolio firm). The 
ability of the venture capitalist to use his or her network of industry connections to “recycle” good 
                                                 
2 That is, before the firm  has a product on the market or has gone public. 
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managers whose firms fail (for exogenous reasons) may permit the venture capitalist to attract 
skilled managers more successfully.  
High-risk activities also make the process of screening managers more difficult. The 
managers of firms in new industries (where risk is higher) will be less well known to the market 
because of the relative absence of publicly traded securities (and, therefore, public information 
creation) for that sector. Greater risk also reduces the signal-to-noise ratio with respect to 
managerial ability. Thus, venture capitalists’ access to private information about managerial talent 
gives them an advantage in recruiting that is increasing in importance with the riskiness of the 
industry.  
We hypothesize that venture capital brings non-financial benefits to new projects because it 
allows venture capitalists to use their human resource networking capabilities to transfer valuable 
information acquired in previous investments and to provide an employment “safety net” for 
managers. Both the risk aversion of managers, and the adverse-selection problem in identifying 
managerial talent imply that the comparative advantage of venture capitalists as human resource 
managers will be an increasing function of the riskiness of the portfolio firm. That hypothesis finds 
some support in the studies of Hellmann and Puri (2002) and Hsu (2004). Hellman and Puri find 
that the role of venture capital in attracting outsider CEOs is stronger for firms in their early stages 
(when the prospects for senior managers is riskier). Hsu (2004) finds that venture capitalists that are 
regarded as having superior network resources (including management recruiting contacts) are 
more likely to succeed when bidding for portfolio firms, and that venture capitalists that possess 
superior network resources are more likely to be engaged in early-stage financing. 
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Our empirical examination of cross-sectional differences in the extent that venture 
capitalists act as human resource managers permits us to test this hypothesis, and other potential 
influences on the comparative advantage of venture capitalists in human resource management, 
more directly. Our empirical work is based on a nationwide survey of venture capitalists that 
identifies various characteristics of portfolio firms and venture capitalists, using objective and 
subjective measures. These characteristics include the riskiness of portfolio firms and the extent of 
venture capitalists’ involvement in human resource management, as well as many other attributes 
of portfolio firms and venture capitalists that are relevant to the comparative advantage of venture 
capitalists in human resource management (e.g., the size of the fund, and the subjective value 
attributed to the venture capitalist’s human resource network as a source of information).  
The survey results confirm that human resource networking is an important activity. A 
majority of the venture capitalists confirm that their relationships with their colleagues include 
acting on their suggestions when hiring managers, and in turn recommending managers to each 
other. A substantial proportion of venture capitalists affirm that they adopt the strategy of recycling 
managers in their portfolio firms.  
We find that the extent to which venture capitalists act as human resource managers 
depends positively on various factors, including: (1) the subjective risk venture capitalists attribute 
to their investments and observable attributes of the investments related to riskiness; (2) the value 
they attach to the information transmitted through their networks,; (3) the size of their funds (which 
should be positively correlated with their networking ability); and (4) the extent to which venture 
capitalists believe that the firms that they finance would tend to have difficulty recruiting managers. 
Venture capitalists surveyed also provide evidence that their networking activities are motivated by 
perceived cost savings in recruiting managers. Venture capitalists report that greater networking 
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results in an improved ability to attract managers due to the reputation venture capitalists acquire 
for recycling (assisting managers with job placement in the future). 
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the operation of human resource 
networks within the venture capital industry, and their importance in creating information about 
managers ex ante, and the potential for recycling managers ex post. There we consider qualitative 
evidence of the importance of networks in transferring valuable information about managers, and 
managers themselves, across firms. Section 3 summarizes our model of the decision to network 
(which is developed in detail in Carvalho and de Matos 2003). Section 4 describes the survey and 
relates some of the survey data to the variables in the theoretical framework. Regression analysis of 
the incentives to network, hypothesized in the model, is presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Screening, Insurance, and the Role of Venture Capital Human Resource Networks 
Firms receiving venture capital funding are typically very risky. More importantly, these 
firms are characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. Managers frequently have 
more accurate information about the prospects of the firm than they may be willing to reveal. This 
information asymmetry makes project governance extremely important. Among the mechanisms 
venture capitalists adopt to deal with this problem are close monitoring and staging of the 
investment [Sahlman (1990), Gompers (1995), and Lerner (1995)].  
To increase the likelihood of success and improve their information about the quality of 
projects, venture capitalists frequently become actively involved in the operation of their portfolio 
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firms. For example, they sit on the board of directors, hire3 and recruit managers, help establish 
business strategies, provide industry knowledge, structure deals with suppliers and customers, and 
act as confidants to managers [Sahlman (1990)]. Because many of the firms suitable to receive 
venture capital funds are young companies lacking experience in human resources management, 
venture capitalists often become involved in selecting, recruiting and properly remunerating key 
employees.4 
This involvement of venture capitalists within portfolio firms provides venture capitalists 
with expertise in selecting, recruiting, and properly remunerating managers, as well as in timing the 
development of the firms as organizations (e.g., deciding when the time is right to add a 
professional CEO or CFO). Furthermore, this involvement gives venture capitalists non-public 
information about the abilities and qualifications of the managers in the firms they fund. 
Even though venture capitalists fund firms with potential to become publicly traded, more 
often than not, their investments end when their portfolio firms are either liquidated, merge, or are 
acquired by larger corporations. For example, Venture Economics (1988) reports that 34.5% of 
venture capital investments resulted in losses (result based on a sample of 383 companies funded 
13 venture capital partnerships between 1969 and 1985). Black and Gilson (1998) presents data 
from 1984 to 1996 showing that a significant number of venture capital investments exit through 
acquisitions. In these cases, the portfolio firm generally becomes a division of the acquiring 
corporation and does not need a senior management team. Therefore, in many cases, senior 
managers leave their companies when they are sold or liquidated (this is not necessarily so if the 
                                                 
3 For example, Baker and Gompers (1999) found that only 55% of the CEOs of venture capital-backed firms going 
public are founders. Hellmann and Puri (2000) found that 61% of firms funded with venture capital experienced a 
turnover. 
4 The adjective “properly” refers to the design of contracts that gives the managers the right incentives, aligning his or 
her interests with those of the investors. 
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firm goes public). The limited viability of senior managers in firms funded with venture capital 
means that many portfolio firm managers often are available for repeat hire by venture capitalists. 
Venture capitalists bring to a project the expertise they develop in selecting, recruiting, and 
remunerating managers, and in timing the development of the companies as organizations. The 
nature of the involvement of venture capitalists within their portfolio firms provides them with the 
necessary means to acquire non-public information about suppliers, customers, and the 
management team of the companies they fund, and that information can be reused. For instance, 
when they exit an investment, they have the possibility of recycling competent managers by 
rehiring them to manage other firms in their portfolio. 5 
Not only does venture capitalists’ involvement improve managerial quality through screening, 
the recycling of managers across portfolio firms reduces hiring costs via an “insurance effect.” 
Managers in small growing firms are exposed to a high risk of failure. As mentioned before, senior 
managers find themselves in a vulnerable situation when the firm does not go public. The fact that 
venture capitalists can offer another chance in another portfolio firm reduces the firm-specific risk 
that managers bear when joining portfolio firms. This insurance effect may explain Hellmann and 
Puri’s (2002) finding that venture backed companies are faster to bring in outsiders as CEOs.  
                                                 
5 An example of this is given by Kleiner and Perkins, in Institutional Investor (June-1996), pp. 95-96: “The keiretsu 
conceit aside, the Kleiner partners' role in Silicon Valley may in some ways be closer to that of the Hollywood moguls 
of the '30s and '40s, whose success was built on their ability to lock up stars, directors and writers. Kleiner Perkins has 
similarly amassed a pool of talent. ‘If you're well regarded as a manager in their stable, you're going to be used over the 
years,’ says Frank Ingari, whom Doerr tapped to run networking software company Shiva Corp. in 1993.”  “One way 
Doerr hardwires his network is by placing Kleiner CEOs on the boards of other corporate members of the keiretsu...The 
CEO of video game maker Crystal Dynamics, Randy Komisar, one of a number of Go veterans now running Kleiner 
companies, sits on the boards of two Kleiner-associated companies, Total Entertainment Network and MNI nteractive. 
CEO John Kernan of Lightspan Partnership sits on the board of fellow educational software company Academic 
Systems... “The network has been buttressed by the “CEO-in-residence'” program which brings temporarily out-of-
work top executives into Kleiner and Perkins to review business plans, to do a little strategic thinking and help with 
recruiting...” 
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Both the screening and insurance effects depend on the possibility of consecutively 
employing managers in distinct portfolio firms. The possibility of the same venture capitalist 
redeploying the same manager are somewhat restricted since few venture capital funds are large 
enough to match job openings with the availability of managers. However, one factor that broadens 
the ability to reuse non-public information about managers is the close relationship among venture 
capitalists, which is an outgrowth of the syndication of investments. 
Syndication of investments is commonly used to improve screening, achieve better 
monitoring, broader their sources of funds, and diversify their portfolio [Lerner (1994)]. The 
possibilities for syndication depend on both the connections a venture capitalist has, and on his or 
her reputation among other venture capitalists. Syndication creates strong bonds among venture 
capitalists and, therefore, allows reliable information to flow among them. The fact that reliable 
information can flow among venture capitalists gives them an unusual role as certifiers of senior 
managers' abilities (in the context of small growth firms financing), and allows them to operate an 
informal network to locate and relocate skilled managers.  
3. The Decision to Network 
Here we summarize the model presented formally in Carvalho and de Matos (2003). The 
venture capitalist conducts a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to use a network of venture 
capitalists when hiring managers or use a headhunter to find managerial talent. The degree or 
probability of project success increases with the quality of the management. The venture capitalist 
establishes a desired profile for the manager. This profile includes verifiable characteristics such as 
experience, industry knowledge, etc. It also includes some non-verifiable characteristics. For 
instance, very few managers can certify their ability to lead young, fast-growing firms into 
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becoming large, well-structured organizations. Successful managers in large corporations may lack 
that skill. These non-verifiable characteristics define the managers’ type. The model assumes that 
beforehand neither venture capitalists nor managers know managers' types.  
The cost of locating a manager depends on the means used. The cost of hiring a search firm 
is assumed to be the same for all venture capitalists. To locate managers through the network, the 
venture capitalist needs to establish relations with other venture capitalists. The cost of networking 
is equivalent to the monetary value of the time that the venture capitalist has to spend establishing 
connections. Once the venture capitalist is networked, he or she has access to suggestions coming 
from his or her network colleagues. The cost of networking when hiring varies across venture 
capitalists depending on the potential for networking that each venture capitalist has, which in turn 
can be related to factors like the size of the venture capital fund, the number of partners, how much 
the venture capitalist syndicates investments, etc. 
The outcome of the project will become public information and influence the future salary 
that the manager expects to obtain in his or her next job. If the firm fails, the manager's future 
salary will be lower than in case of success. Managers are risk-averse and venture capitalists are 
risk-neutral. 
In addition to using the network for hiring, venture capitalists who network can assist 
managers with job placement by suggesting managers to other venture capitalists.6 A possible 
future referral works as an option that managers acquire when they are hired. If the project fails, 
with a given probability, the assistance can increase the future salary of the manager. In the model, 
                                                 
6 Only those who locate managers through the network have the option of actively suggesting managers. This 
dependence allows us to incorporate into the model the idea that venture capitalists who suggest managers have an 
advantage when recruiting managers because suggesting managers reduces the firm-specific risks to which managers 
are exposed (the insurance effect). 
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if the firm succeeds, this assistance is irrelevant to the future salary of the manager. By suggesting 
managers venture capitalists incur a specific cost. This cost is equivalent to the monetary value of 
the effort and time that the venture capitalist has to spend contacting other venture capitalists to 
find a match for the managers. This cost varies inversely with venture capitalists' network 
connections.  
In the model, the decision to network involves two aspects: suggesting managers and acting 
on suggestions when hiring a manager. The decisions to use the network for hiring and for 
suggesting are separate but related. First, the venture capitalist decides whether or not to participate 
in the network when hiring managers. If the venture capitalist chooses to use the network for hiring, 
then he or she has the option also to provide suggestions to the network. The decision to use the 
network for hiring does not imply that the venture capitalist must use the network for suggesting, 
but it does make suggesting possible. In turn, the option to suggest managers does affect the 
decision to use the network for hiring purposes in the first instance, because those who actively 
suggest managers have an advantage when recruiting managers: managers would accept a monetary 
salary below their reservation salary because the recommendation increases their expected future 
salary.  
In the model, the benefit that venture capitalists create from suggesting managers is 
captured by them entirely in the form of lower compensation paid to the managers. When the 
venture capitalist suggests managers through a network, the manager's reservation salary is 
diminished by a given amount (reflecting the reduction in risk faced by the manager). That amount 
represents the gain that the venture capitalist receives by suggesting managers. The venture 
capitalist will suggest managers whenever that gain is larger than the costs of suggesting.  
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The gain received by the venture capitalist from networking increases with the riskiness of 
the portfolio firm. Assistance with job placement has value to managers only if the firms they 
manage fail. Thus, the higher the chances of failure, the higher will be the value that managers 
attribute to the assistance, and thus, the higher the discount on the reservation salary that they are 
willing to accept. Venture capitalists stand to gain more from suggesting managers involved in 
risky projects. 
In the model, the benefits from taking suggestions from the network when hiring managers 
can be decomposed into three factors.7 A first factor reflects the value to the venture capitalist of 
networking’s effect on higher managerial quality. Firms in which differences in managerial quality 
have greater consequences for firm performance will benefit more from locating highly skilled 
management, and will rely more on networks to do so to the extent that networks improve the 
accuracy of the screening process for hiring managers. With respect to this first factor, in the 
model, the benefits from improved managerial screening depend positively upon three physical 
parameters: (1) the relative profitability of a successful project outcome – i.e., the riskiness of the 
project (2) the effect of managerial quality on the probability of a successful outcome, and (3) the 
value of networking for identifying skilled managers. In the model, these three parameters appear 
in a multiplicative way such that the strength of each effect depends on the size of the other two 
parameters. 
The second factor is the insurance effect. This is the benefit captured by the venture 
capitalist by being able to offer to recycle managers via the network, which takes the form of a 
                                                 
7 There is also a fourth factor highlighted in the model, which does not correspond to any observable variables in our 
survey, and which is therefore excluded from this discussion. The fourth factor is the possible additional gain to the 
venture capitalist from using the network if managers located through the network have a lower probability of being 
otherwise employed than those coming through headhunters. For the conclusions in this article, it is not important 
whether managers located through the network have a lower probability of being employed than those located through 
headhunters. 
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reduction in the manager’s reservation level for compensation. The value of the insurance effect 
depends positively on: (1) the riskiness of the project, and (2) the credibility of the commitment 
from the venture capitalist to recycle. Note that the insurance effect, therefore, provides a second 
rationale for a positive relationship between risk and the decision by venture capitalists to 
participate in networks.  
The third factor reflects cost savings to the venture capitalist from the difference between 
the physical cost of networking and the physical cost of headhunting. It is plausible to assume that 
using a headhunter has a constant marginal cost that is the same for all venture capitalists. In 
contrast, the cost of networking should decline with the size of the venture capital fund. Two 
conjectures relate the size of the venture fund to the costs of networking. First, large funds are 
managed by many venture capitalists. Therefore, the incidence of suggestions coming from partners 
or persons associated with them is more frequent. Secondly, other venture capitalists may have an 
interest in developing good relations with venture capitalists managing large funds. This may occur 
because of the interest that venture capitalists have in prospective syndications [Lerner (1994)].8 
Moreover, well-established venture capitalists are opinion makers in the industry. Therefore, the 
flow of reliable suggestions to venture capitalists managing large funds can be more intense. 
In summary, when one combines the effects of these three factors, the model predicts that a 
venture capitalist’s reliance on networking when hiring managers is positively related to several 
characteristics of the portfolio firm or the venture capitalist: (1) project risk, (2) the effect of 
managerial quality on the probability of a successful outcome, (3) the value of networking for 
identifying skilled managers, (4) the credibility of the venture capitalist’s commitment to recycle, 
                                                 
8 For instance, this can be related to what Lerner calls window-dressing: venture capital funds want to show that they 
financed successful enterprises in order to promote fund raising. Because of this, the opportunity to join a successful 
enterprise through syndication is extremely valuable. 
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and (5) the size of the venture capitalist. Note that project risk affects the benefits of networking 
positively through two distinct affects: the marginal productivity of managerial screening, and the 
insurance effect. Also, recall that the insurance effect (which is reflected in characteristics (4) and 
(1)) on the propensity to use networks for hiring is only relevant for venture capitalists that use the 
network for recycling managers, as well.  
The same five characteristics listed above should predict the use of the network for 
recycling (suggesting) managers, as well as for hiring them. In the model, the insurance effect in 
the hiring decision is only operative if the venture capitalist chooses to participate in suggesting 
managers for recycling via the network. Conversely, in the model, suggesting is only physically 
possible if the venture capitalist has already decided to participate in the network for hiring 
purposes. This interdependence between the two endogenous networking decisions implies that any 
exogenous variable that directly influences the probability of deciding in favor of doing one also 
raises the probability of deciding in favor of the other.  
4. Survey Data  
Data concerning the existence and use of the hiring network among venture capitalists were 
obtained through two surveys of venture capitalists. The first (referred to as “the survey”) was 
answered by 160 venture capitalists and contains mostly qualitative information. The second 
(referred to as “the follow-up”), contains more quantitative questions, for which we obtained 68 
responses. Creating these two new datasets through surveys permitted us to match the exogenous 
structure in the model to observable variables.  
The survey was sent to 879 venture capitalists throughout the US, randomly taken from 
“Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources (1994),” a publication that lists all the venture capital 
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sources and their managers. Among the 160 respondents, 70 agreed to a phone interview and a 
follow-up survey, but we could reach only 68 of them. The survey and interviews were done in 
1995 and 1996. Through the interviews we discovered that four respondents to the original survey 
were persons not directly involved in the investment process. These four responses were deleted, 
resulting in a final sample of 156 survey responses and 68 follow-up responses. Table 1 describes 
the variables derived from the survey and follow-up. 
As a first step in our analysis, we investigate the perceived importance of human resource 
management by venture capitalists. In the survey, to assess the importance of recruiting managers, 
the respondents were asked to rank the three activities performed by venture capitalists that they 
considered most important. They were given a menu including (1) monitoring performance against 
goals, (2) helping with management decisions, (3) providing industry knowledge, (4) providing 
finance, (5) developing business strategy, and (6) recruiting managers. Respondents were also 
given two blank slots to fill in activities that they deemed important that were not included in this 
list. A significant proportion (16.7%) listed recruiting managers as the most important activity; 
35.5% viewed it as one of the two most important activities, and 54.2% described it as one of the 
three most important (Table 2).  
Survey respondents were also asked to quantify various aspects of their human resource 
management activities. Table 3 presents data on the number of executives that the venture capitalist 
has employed more than once or helped with job placement in the previous 5 years. Table 3 also 
provides data on the number of CEOs replaced in the previous 5 years. The mode and median of 
the empirical distribution for placement is 2. The mode of the empirical distribution for 
replacement is 3, and the median is 4. Table 3 clearly shows that some venture capitalists are far 
more active than others, which may reflect either differences in the total number of portfolio firms 
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across venture capitalists, or differences in the intensity of human resource management. To 
provide a clearer indicator of the intensity of human resource management activity, the bottom 
panel of Table 3 reports placement and replacement activity relative to the size of the venture 
capital fund (measured by the number of DEALS in the past five years).  
Venture capitalists were asked to express their degree of agreement with the following 
propositions: (1) “venture capitalists operate informal networks involved in locating and relocating 
managers” (proposition NETWORK); (2) “it is common for me to suggest likely managers to 
others in the private equity industry” (proposition SUGGEST); (3) “it is common for me to act on 
suggestions from others in the private equity industry when hiring a top manager for a firm” 
(proposition TAKE SUGGESTIONS); and (4) “once I learn about the good qualifications of a 
manager, I try to keep him/her working for companies I fund, i.e., I entice him/her to leave a firm 
when I sell or liquidate it and take a position in another company I fund” (proposition 
RECYCLING STRATEGY). The follow-up also asked venture capitalists to state the number of 
managers that the venture capitalist had hired under recommendation and suggested in the previous 
5 years both to/from partners and non-partners. The responses to all of these questions are reported 
in Table 4, where Panel A summarizes responses to the four questions listed above, and Panel B 
summarizes responses to the follow-up questions about networking. 
Clearly, venture capitalists strongly believe in the existence of a human resource network. A 
large majority, 77.9%, agreed that they operate informal networks (proposition NETWORK, Table 
4, Panel A); only 6.5% disagreed. Fully 56.2% agreed that it is common for them to suggest likely 
managers to others in the private equity industry; only 19.3% disagreed (proposition SUGGEST, 
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Table 4, Panel A).9 The results in the follow-up (Table 4, Panel B) confirm this last result from the 
survey. Only 24.6% had not suggested any manager to partners and 24.6% to non-partners. Finally, 
the proportion of venture capitalists that had not recommended any manager amounts to 12.7%, 
while those who had recommended more than 4 is 52.7%. 
Most respondents (62.3%) agreed that it is common for them to act on suggestions when 
hiring managers (7.1% strongly agreed); only 11% disagreed (proposition TAKE SUGGESTIONS, 
Table 4, Panel A).10 The numbers in the follow-up (Table 4, Panel B) are consistent with these 
results: only 19% of the respondents had not hired any manager under suggestion (30.5% had not 
hired any manager under suggestion of partners and 52.5%, from non-partners). The proportion of 
those who hired more than 3 managers under recommendation is 30.2%. A considerable proportion 
of venture capitalists (37%) affirm that they adopt a recycling strategy (proposition RECYCLING 
STRATEGY, Table 4, Panel A).11 
Summary statistics from our survey and follow-up show that a significant proportion of 
venture capitalists suggest managers to each other, act on suggestions when hiring senior managers, 
and have a strategy of recycling managers. It is particularly striking that a large proportion of 
venture capitalists agree that they operate informal networks involved in locating and relocating 
managers.  
 Survey responses also provide evidence on the motives of venture capitalists in using 
human resource networks. We hypothesize that an important element that may explain the 
                                                 
9 The answer given to this question by the subsample of those who answered the follow-up is very similar: 10.3% agree 
strongly, 52.9% agree, 22.1% are indifferent, and 14.7% disagree. 
10 The answer given to this question by the subsample of those who answered the follow-up is very similar: 10.3% 
agree strongly, 52.9% agree, 32.4% are indifferent, 2.9% disagree, and 1.5% strongly disagree. 
11 Through telephonic interviews, several venture capitalists recognized that the small number of deals does not allow 
them to implement this strategy, although they would be willing to do it. 
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motivation that venture capitalists have in networking is the relatively high value that they attribute 
to the information that they obtain from each other. More specifically, we hypothesize that venture 
capitalists have (or at least think they have) information about managers that search firms do not.  
To address that hypothesis, venture capitalists were asked to express their degree of 
agreement with the following propositions: (1) “the success of the firms I fund depends mostly on 
their top managers” (proposition MANAGERIAL IMPACT); (2) ”as a venture capitalist I learn 
substantially more about the managers of the companies I fund than what can be revealed to 
outsiders by their track records” (proposition INSIDE INFORMATION); and (3) “to manage a 
firm funded with venture capital requires different skills from those needed to manage a company 
funded with other sources of capital” (proposition SPECIAL SKILLS).  
The level of agreement with these propositions is presented in Table 5, Panel A. The 
overwhelming majority (93.5%) of respondents agreed that, through their relations with managers, 
they learn substantially more about the managers than what can be revealed to outsiders by the 
managers' records (proposition INSIDE INFORMATION). An even higher level of agreement 
(95.5%) is attained for the proposition MANAGERIAL IMPACT. Finally, 58.7% agree that to 
manage for venture capital investors require special skills (proposition SPECIAL SKILLS). 
Together, these responses support the hypothesis that information about managerial skills is 
important and not readily available. 
Next, in Table 5, Panel B, we examine venture capitalists’ views of the challenges they face 
in recruiting managers, and the extent to which the operation of a human resource network can help 
to reduce the costs of hiring skilled managers. We asked respondents to express their degree of 
agreement with various propositions related to their activities as human resources recruiters. These 
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propositions are: (1) “it can be difficult to entice a manager to leave a stable position in a well 
established company and take a chance in a new firm with risky prospects” (proposition 
DIFFICULT HIRE); (2) “if it were not for their confidence in my personal commitments to them, 
some of the top managers of the companies I fund might not have accepted the job offer they 
received” (proposition PERSONAL COMMITMENTS); and (3) “having a reputation of helping 
good managers with job placement, in the event that the companies for which they work are 
liquidated, helps entice other managers to work for other companies I fund” (proposition 
REPUTATION).  
The data in Table 5, Panel B, indicate that venture capitalists make personal commitments 
to managers, and rely on their personal reputations for helping managers to find replacement jobs, 
as a means of enticing managers to come to their portfolio firms, which managers may be reluctant 
to do because of the riskiness of those portfolio firms. The majority of respondents (54.5% agree 
that it can be difficult to entice managers to a risky portfolio firm, while 25% disagree. 68.7% of 
respondents emphasize the importance of their personal commitment to managers in getting them 
to accept a job, while 9.8% disagree. 44% agree that their reputations for assisting in recycling 
managers help entice managers to their portfolio firms, while 15.1% disagree.  
5. Explaining Differences in Venture Capitalists’ Reliance on Human Resource Networking 
The summary statistics described thus far demonstrate that venture capitalists tend to agree 
that: (1) human resource networking is an important activity, (2) information about managerial 
quality is important, (3) venture capitalists obtain unique information about their managers, and (4) 
participating in a human resource network is important for attracting skilled managers. 
Interestingly, however, the results in Tables 2-5 also show that there is a considerable amount of 
 19
variation in the opinions venture capitalists express about the importance of participating in human 
resource networks, and the importance of those networks for attracting skilled managers. In Section 
3, we described a model (developed in detail in Carvalho and de Matos 2003) that suggests 
explanations for that variation in opinion and practice. Specifically, the model suggests that cross-
sectional variation in the perceived importance of networks, or in the desire to participate in them, 
should be linked to factors identified in the model. This section explores the extent to which cross-
sectional differences in the use of networks can be explained by observable characteristics of 
venture capitalists, as predicted by the model. 
In what follows, we use respondents’ answers to the propositions SUGGEST and TAKE 
SUGGESTIONS (both from the survey), the number of managers hired under suggestion from non-
partners (from the follow-up), and the number of managers recommended to non-partners (from the 
follow-up) as alternative endogenous variables to measure the extent of the reliance by venture 
capitalists on networks. TAKE SUGGESTIONS and the number of managers hired under 
suggestion are alternative measures of the propensity to network when hiring. SUGGEST and the 
number of managers recommended are alternative measures of the propensity to supply managers 
to the network. In the model, these are separate decisions. The model suggests factors that should 
explain variation in the reliance on networks for both hiring and suggesting. We measure 
explanatory factors using observable variables based on responses to propositions in the survey and 
follow-up, and then test to see whether these observable explanatory variables can explain cross-
sectional variation in our measures of reliance on networks.  
At the end of Section 3 above, we described the empirical predictions of the Carvalho-de 
Matos (2003) model. According to the model, there should be a positive association between the 
propensity to rely on networks, for both hiring and suggesting, and the following characteristics: (1) 
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project risk, (2) the effect of managerial quality on the probability of a successful outcome, (3) the 
value of networking for identifying skilled managers, (4) the credibility of the venture capitalist’s 
commitment to recycle, and (5) the size of the venture capitalist.  
5.1. Measuring the Determinants of Using Networks 
Project risk: We employ three alternative measures of project risk: RISK (Table 1), 
EARLY (Table 1), and DIFFICULT HIRE (Table 5, Panel B). RISK is a subjective measure of risk 
by the venture capitalist. It is the response to the question: “In the realm of venture capital, how 
would you classify most of your investments (use a scale from 1 for low risk to 5 for high risk)?”  
EARLY is an indicator for whether early-stage venture capital is an important area of the 
venture capitalist’s business. Specifically, we asked the venture capitalists to list the three types of 
financing with which they are primarily involved. The possible categories included seed, startup, 
R&D, first-stage, second-stage, mezzanine, LBO, acquisition financing, control block purchase, 
industry consolidation, and a blank slot for other unlisted types.12 The first four of these categories 
are considered early-stage venture capital. EARLY is the number of early-stage venture capital 
activities that were listed in the venture capitalist’s list of top three activities. For example, for a 
venture capitalist that listed R&D, first-stage, and second-stage as his three top categories of 
activity, EARLY would have a value of 2. As expected, RISK is strongly correlated with EARLY 
(the correlation coefficient is 0.67). As shown in Table 6, responses measured by the variables 
RISK and EARLY are reasonably well distributed over the potential range of responses, indicating 
substantial heterogeneity in our sample. 
                                                 
12 This classification of the industry was taken from Venture Economics (1994). 
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DIFFICULT HIRE (Table 5, Panel B) is a measure of risk that is especially relevant for 
capturing the insurance effect, but it is also useful more broadly as a gauge of the riskiness of the 
activities of the venture capitalist. 
Managerial Impact: We capture the effect of managerial quality on the probability of a 
successful outcome with the variable MANAGERIAL IMPACT (Table 5, Panel A).  
Network’s Value: The value of networking for identifying skilled managers is captured by 
SPECIAL SKILLS (Table 5, Panel A). To the extent that the skills of managers are unusual, it 
should be harder to locate skilled managers, and therefore, the potential contribution of networking 
should be relatively greater. 
Recycling Credibility: We capture the credibility of the venture capitalist’s commitment to 
suggest/recycle with the variable REPUTATION (Table 5, Panel B). This variable measures the 
extent to which the venture capitalist believes that having a reputation for credible recycling is 
important, which should be closely related to the extent to which the venture capitalist has invested 
in such a reputation. Reputation is relevant directly for the value of the suggesting service offered 
by the venture capitalist, and indirectly, through the insurance effect, for the value of participating 
in the hiring network. 
 Size: Size is measured by CAPITAL (Table 1), which is defined as the amount of capital 
that the venture capital fund currently has under management. 
5.2 Regressions 
Recall that we consider four measures of the decision to network, two that capture the use of 
networks for hiring managers, and two that capture the use of networks for suggesting/recycling 
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managers. Two of these four endogenous variables (one for hiring and one for suggesting) are 
measured as ordered variables (that is, they are expressions of the degree of agreement or 
disagreement with certain propositions). The other two endogenous variables are integer measures 
of the number of managers hired and suggested. We employ ordered probit analysis to explain 
variation in the ordered variables, and Poisson regression analysis to explain variation in the integer 
variables.  In all four sets of regressions, we use the same set of seven explanatory variables, 
namely RISK, EARLY, DIFFICULT HIRE, MANAGERIAL IMPACT, SPECIAL SKILLS, 
REPUTATION, and CAPITAL. In the Poisson regressions, we also include the number of deals by 
the venture capitalist in the past five years (variable DEALS, Table 1) and the number of senior 
managers hired by the venture capitalist in the past five years (variable HIRINGS, Table 1) as 
scaling control variables.  
Tables 7 and 8 present an empirical analysis of the incentive to hire under suggestions, 
using our two alternative measures of the network hiring propensity. Table 7 presents ordered 
probit regressions where the dependent variable is the extent of agreement with the proposition 
TAKE SUGGESTIONS. Table 8 contains Poisson regressions where the dependent variable is the 
number of managers hired under suggestion from non-partners in the previous 5 years.  
The explanatory variables are consistently positive (with the exception of CAPITAL in 
Table 8, possibly reflecting the influence in Table 8 of the presence of the closely related variables, 
DEALS and HIRINGS), as predicted in the model, and are often statistically significant. We 
alternate our three measures of risk in the various specifications in Tables 7 and 8, and as expected, 
they tend to detract from one another’s explanatory power.  
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The measured effects of SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL IMPACT are positive but 
not highly statistically significant. In the case of MANAGERIAL IMPACT, this may reflect the 
lack of cross-sectional variation in our sample for this variable (see Table 5). Furthermore, although 
we allow SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL IMPACT to enter separately in many 
specifications in Tables 7 and 8, in the Carvalho and de Matos (2003) model, the two variables 
should enter interactively; that is, the importance of each should depend on the importance of the 
other. Thus, in Tables 7 and 8, we also report results where we substitute a new variable, 
INFORMATION VALUE (defined as the product of SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL 
IMPACT) for SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL IMPACT. In Table 7, INFORMATION 
VALUE enters significantly. 
The empirical analysis of the decision to suggest managers appears in Tables 9 and 10, 
which employs the same explanatory variables as Tables 7 and 8. Table 9 presents ordered probit 
regressions where the dependent variable is the degree of agreement with the proposition 
SUGGEST. Table 10 contains Poisson regressions where the dependent variable is the number of 
managers suggested to non-partners in the previous 5 years.  
The variables EARLY, RISK and REPUTATION appear with positive and statistically 
significant coefficients. In the survey sample, the other variables fail to show statistical significance 
in accordance with the model. In follow-up sample, DIFFICULT HIRE is positive and statistically 
significant. In the follow-up sample, SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL IMPACT, or 
alternatively their product, INFORMATION VALUE, enter negatively and statistically significant, 
contrary to the predictions of the model. This indicates that the more venture capitalists values 
unique managerial talent, the less they are willing to suggest managers to the network. In other 
words, while INFORMATION VALUE has a positive effect on the desire by venture capitalists to 
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use the network for the purposes of hiring, it seems to have the opposite effect on their desire to 
suggest (rather than try to retain) talented managers. While this result is contrary to the specific 
model we describe in Section 3, it is not surprising. The Carvalho-de Matos (2003) model does not 
consider the fact that venture capitalists may wish to reuse managers themselves; incorporating that 
feature into the model, we conjecture, could explain the incentives of venture capitalists not to 
suggest managers when those managers possess unique and important talents (which make venture 
capitalists want to keep those managers for themselves).  
6. Conclusion 
A significant part of a firm's value depends upon the skills, knowledge and experience of its 
senior managers. Along with their investment activities, venture capitalists become actively 
involved within their portfolio firms and acquire non-public information about managerial quality. 
Venture capitalists have the opportunity to share that information via their participation in a 
network for hiring skilled managers.  
In this study, we examine evidence of the perceived importance of that network in the 
minds and actions of venture capitalists, and the determinants of their decisions to employ the 
network for human resource management. We compare that evidence with the predictions of the 
Carvalho-De Matos (2003) model of venture capital networking.  
In theory, reliance on the network benefits venture capitalists by raising their portfolio 
firms’ productivity, reducing prospective managers’ risks and compensation, and reducing the costs 
of locating senior managers. Through a nationwide survey, we obtained evidence that venture 
capitalists operate an informal network involved in locating and relocating managers: 77.9% of the 
respondents agreed with the proposition that venture capitalists operate networks for locating and 
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relocating managers. A majority of the venture capitalists affirm that it is common for them to hire 
managers under suggestions from their colleagues (62.3%) and to suggest managers (56.2%). 
Furthermore, 37% affirm that they adopt the strategy of recycling managers. 
Interestingly, there is substantial heterogeneity in the intensity with which venture 
capitalists participate in human resource networks. Econometric analysis of cross-sectional 
variation gives support to the theoretical reasoning that the intensity with which venture capitalists 
locate managers through the network is positively influenced by the following factors: (1) the value 
of the information transmitted though the network (the importance of managerial skill for the 
portfolio firm); (2) the risk of venture capital investments; (3) the size of the venture capital fund; 
(4) the degree of difficulty in enticing executives to manage firms funded with venture capital; and 
(5) the reputation of the venture capitalist for successfully recycling managers via the network.  
Theoretical and empirical arguments provided in this article support the view that venture 
capitalists add value by bringing to their portfolio firms the capacity to attract superior 
management. This indicates that human resources management is one of the keys to understanding 
the success of the venture capital industry. 
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TABLE 1 
Main Variables 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
PLACEMENT 
Answer to the question: in the last five years, approximately how 
many executives have you either employed more than once or 
helped to be placed after their firms were sold or liquidated? 
SURVEY 
REPLACEMENT Answer to the question: approximately how many CEOs have you replaced in the last five years? SURVEY 
DEALS Answer to the question: approximately how many deals have you made in the last five years? SURVEY 
HIRINGS Answer to the question: in the last 5 years, approximately how many managers have you hired? FOLLOW-UP 
AVERAGE 
PLACEMENT Ratio between PLACEMENT and DEALS. SURVEY 
AVERAGE 
REPLACEMENT Ratio between REPLACEMENT and DEALS. SURVEY 
MANAGERS 
SUGGESTED TO 
PARTNERS 
Answer to the question: in the last 5 years, approximately how 
many possible top managers have you recommended to venture 
capitalists who work for your firm? 
FOLLOW-UP 
MANAGERS 
SUGGESTED TO 
NON-PARTNERS 
Answer to the question: in the last 5 years, approximately how 
many possible top managers have you recommended to venture 
capitalists who do not work for your firm? 
FOLLOW-UP 
MANAGERS HIRED 
UNDER SUGGESTION 
OF PARTNERS 
Answer to the question: among the top managers you hired in 
the last 5 years, approximately how many were recommended by 
venture capitalists who work for your firm? 
FOLLOW-UP 
MANAGERS HIRED 
UNDER SUGGESTION 
OF NON-PARTNERS 
Answer to the question: approximately how many of the top 
managers you hired in the last 5 many were suggested by venture 
capitalists who do not work for your firm? 
FOLLOW-UP 
EARLY 
Venture capitalists were asked to rank the three types of 
financing in which they are most involved. The received a list 
containing seed, start up, R&D, first-stage, second-stage, 
mezzanine, bridge financing, LBO, acquisition financing, 
control-block purchase, industry consolidation, and a blank slot 
for other unlisted types. The first four of these categories are 
considered early stage venture capital. Variable EARLY is the 
number of early-stage venture capital activities in the venture 
capitalist’s list of top three activities. 
SURVEY 
RISK 
Venture capitalists were asked to answer the question: in the 
realm of venture capital, how would you classify most of your 
investments (use a scale from 1 for low risk to 5 for high risk). 
SURVEY 
CAPITAL Amount of capital that the funds of a venture capitalist has under management. SURVEY 
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 TABLE 2 
Importance Given by Venture Capitalists to the Activity of Recruiting Managers 
Venture capitalists were asked to rank the three activities performed by venture capitalists that they 
considered most important. They were given a menu including 1) monitoring performance against goals, 2) 
helping with management decisions, 3) providing industry knowledge, 4) providing finance, 5) developing 
business strategy, 6) recruiting managers, and two blank slots to complete with unlisted activities. Some 
answers presented a tie. In case two answers were tied in the first place, the second place was taken as 
blank. If three activities were tied in first, then the second and third places were taken as blank, and so on. 
Rank Frequency Valid percentage 
Most important 26 16.7 
One of the two most important 55 35.5 
One of the three most important 84 54.2 
Not among the three most important 71 45.8 
Missing 1  
Number of answers 155  
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TABLE 3 
Venture Capitalists’ Involvement with Human Resources Management 
PLACEMENT is the number of executives that the venture capitalist has employed more than once or helped with job placement in 
the previous five years and REPLACEMENT is describes the number of CEOs replaced in the previous five years. The in the 
averages, variables PLACEMENT and REPLACEMENT are divided by the number of deals structured in the previous five years. 
When the answer was in the form of an interval, the midpoint was considered. This is why some answers are non-integer numbers. 
PLACEMENT REPLACEMENT Number of 
Managers Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
0 35 24.8 24.8 7 4.9 4.9 
1 & 1.5 16 11.4 36.2 15 10.5 15.4 
2 36 25.5 61.7 18 12.6 28.0 
3 & 3.5 27 19.2 80.9 29 20.3 48.3 
4 3 2.1 83.0 20 13.9 62.2 
5 11 7.8 90.8 20 13.9 76.1 
6 2 1.4 92.2 5 3.5 79.6 
7 1 0.7 92.9 2 1.4 81.0 
8 & 8.5 1 0.7 93.6 6 4.2 85.3 
≥ 10 9 6.4 100.0 21 14.7 100.0 
 Total 141   143   
AVERAGE PLACEMENT AVERAGE REPLACEMENT Number of 
Managers 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.1 59 41.5 41.5 11 7.9 7.9 
0.1 < x ≤ 0.2 34 24.0 65.5 40 28.5 36.4 
0.2 < x ≤ 0.3 21 14.8 80.3 17 12.0 48.6 
0.3 < x ≤ 0.4 7 4.9 85.2 28 20.0 68.6 
0.4 < x ≤ 0.5 8 5.6 90.8 20 14.3 82.9 
0.5 < x ≤ 0.6 3 2.2 93.0 9 6.4 89.3 
0.6 < x ≤ 0.8 4 2.8 95.8 5 3.6 92.9 
0.8 < x 6 4.2 100.0 10 7.1 100.0 
 Total 142   140   
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TABLE 4 
Evidence on the Existence of the Network 
Panel A: QUALITATIVE DATA 
(in percentage) 
Proposition Wording Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree
Number of 
answers 
NETWORK 
Venture capitalists operate informal 
networks involved in locating and relocating 
competent managers 
19.5 58.4 15.6 5.2 1.3 
 
155 
(100) 
SUGGEST 
It is common for me to suggest likely 
managers to others in the private equity 
business 
6.5 49.7 24.5 18.7 0.6 
 
155 
(100) 
TAKE 
SUGGESTIONS 
It is common for me to act on suggestions 
from others in the private equity industry 
when hiring a top manager for a firm 
7.1 55.2 26.7 9.7 1.3 
 
154 
(100) 
RECYCLING 
STRATEGY 
Once I learn about the good qualifications of 
a manager, I try to keep him/her working for 
companies I fund, i.e., I entice him/her to 
leave a firm when I sell or liquidate it and 
take a position in another company I fund 
8.4 28.6 27.3 23.7 13.0 
 
156 
(100) 
Panel B: QUANTITATIVE DATA 
(in percentage) 
Managers Suggested to Managers Suggested by Number of 
Managers Partners Non-partners Both Partners Non-partners Both 
0 24.6 24.6 12.7 30.5 52.5 19.0 
1 8.7 15.7 3.6 28.8 21.3 22.4 
2 17.5 17.5 9.1 15.2 18.0 17.2 
3 12.2 12.2 12.7 8.9 3.2 12.1 
4 5.2 1.7 9.1 6.8 1.6 10.3 
≥ 5 31.5 28.0 52.7 10.2 3.2 19.0 
Total 57 (100) 
57 
(100) 
55 
(100) 
59 
(100) 
61 
(100) 
58 
(100) 
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TABLE 5 
Challenges in Recruiting Managers and the Value of the Network  
 (in percentage) 
Panel A: VALUE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE INFORMATION 
Proposition Wording Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree
Number of 
answers 
MANAGERIAL 
IMPACT 
The success of the type of firms I fund 
depends mostly on their top managers 71.1 24.4 3.2 1.3 0.0 
 
156 
(100) 
INSIDE 
INFORMATION 
As a venture capitalist I learn substantially 
more about the managers of the companies I 
fund than what can be revealed to outsiders 
by their track records 
49.7 43.8 5.2 1.3 0.0 
 
153 
(100) 
SPECIAL 
 SKILLS 
To manage a firm funded with venture 
capital requires different skills from those 
needed to manage a company funded with 
other sources of capital 
14.8 43.9 18.7 20.0 2.6 
 
155 
(100) 
Panel B: VENTURE CAPITALIST’S CHALLENGES IN RECRUITING MANAGERS 
DIFFICULT 
 HIRE 
It can be difficult to entice a top manager to 
leave a stable position in a well established 
company and take a chance in a new firm 
with risky prospects 
12.2 42.3 20.5 21.8 3.2 
 
156 
(100) 
PERSONAL 
COMMITMENTS 
If it were not for their confidence in my 
personal commitment to them, some of the 
top managers of the companies I fund might 
not have accepted the job offer they received 
20.3 48.4 21.5 7.8 2.0 
 
153 
(100) 
REPUTATION 
Having a reputation of helping good 
managers with job placement, in the event 
that the companies for which they work are 
liquidated, helps entice other managers to 
work for other firms I fund 
7.2 36.8 40.9 10.5 4.6 
 
152 
(100) 
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TABLE 6 
Characteristics of Venture Capitalist in the Sample 
EARLY takes the value of 0, 1, 2, or 3, which corresponds to the number of early-stage financing listed among the three 
main types of financing performed by a venture capitalist. RISK corresponds to a subjective assessment of the riskiness 
of the venture capitalist’s investments on a scale from 1 for low risk to 5 for high risk. EXPERIENCE is the number of 
years in the venture capital industry. Deals represent the number of deals made in the previous 5 years. These variables 
are precisely described in Table 1. 
EARLY RISK 
 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
0 45 28.8 28.8    
1 20 12.8 41.6 7 4.5 4.5 
2 & 2.5 41 26.3 67.9 28 18.2 22.7 
3 & 3.5 50 32.1 100.0 37 24.1 46.8 
4 & 4.5    49 31.8 78.6 
5    33 21.4 100.0 
 Total 156   154   
HIRINGS DEALS  
Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
 0 ≤ x ≤ 3 8 12.9 12,9 5 3.5 3.5 
3 < x ≤ 6 23 37.1 50.0 22 15.3 18.8 
6 < x ≤ 9 4 6.5 56.5 18 12.5 31.3 
9 < x ≤ 12 14 22.5 79.0 39 27.0 58.3 
12 < x ≤ 15 7 11.2 90.2 10 7.0 65.3 
16 < x ≤ 20 3 4.9 95.1 21 14.6 79.9 
21 < x ≤ 25 0 0 95.1 10 6.9 86.8 
25 < x 3 4.9 100 19 13.2 100.0 
 Total 62   144   
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TABLE 7 
Empirical Determinants of the Decision to Network: Taking Suggestions 
The dependent variable is the agreement to proposition TAKE SUGGESTIONS: it is common for me to act on suggestions from others in the private equity 
industry when hiring a top manager for a firm. Independent variables are described in Tables 1 and 5. Variable INFORMATION VALUE is the product of 
variables SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL IMPACT. Estimates come from ordered probit analysis.  In parentheses are the regression coefficients’ 
z-values. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
0.10        0.13 0.13 0.11SPECIAL SKILLS (1.12)        (1.48) (1.56) (1.18)
0.24 0.19 0.19 0.25     MANAGERIAL 
IMPACT (1.59) (1.30) (1.30) (1.63)     
0.03* 0.03* 0.03** 0.03*INFORMATION 
VALUE         (1.88) (1.95) (2.10) (1.84)
0.23** 0.10** 0.24** 0.24** 0.22** 0.26** 0.24** 0.23** REPUTATION (2.23) (2.54) (2.41) (2.29) (2.13) (2.47) (2.35) (2.19) 
0.22**      0.25*** 0.20** 0.24**DIFFICULT 
HIRE (2.36)        (2.64) (2.24) (2.52)
 0.14*  0.15  0.14*  0.14 RISK  (1.73)  (1.27)  (1.73)  (1.24) 
0.12 0.03 0.12 0.04EARLY         (1.60) (0.30) (1.60) (0.33)
0.16** 0.11 0.14* 0.16** 0.16** 0.12 0.14* 0.16** logCAPITAL (2.25) (1.59) (1.93) (2.06) (2.24) (1.61) (1.95) (2.06) 
N 144        142 144 142 144 142 144 142
Pseudo R2 0.05        0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07
LogLikelihood -151.85        -150.18 -153.38 -146.52 -152.01 -150.18 -153.25 -146.84
Wald χ2 18.58        15.61 15.52 22.92 18.26 15.60 15.79 22.27
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of  10, 5, and 1%  respectively (2-tailed) 
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TABLE 8 
Empirical Determinants of the Number of Managers Hired under Suggestion of Non-Partners 
The dependent variable is the number of managers hired under suggestion of non-partners in the previous 5 years. Independent variables are described in 
Tables 1 and 5. Variable INFORMATION VALUE is the product of variables SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL IMPACT. Estimates come from 
Poisson regressions.  In parentheses are the regression coefficients’ z-values. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
0.25        0.31 0.24 0.25SPECIAL SKILLS (1.35)        (1.63) (1.35) (1.32)
0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.04     MANAGERIAL 
IMPACT (0.00) (0.12) (0.28) (0.21)     
    0.30    0.03 0.03 0.03INFORMATION 
VALUE         (1.03) (1.18) (1.21) (1.14)
0.09 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.25 0.17 REPUTATION (0.54) (1.25) (1.45) (0.85) (0.67) (1.43) (1.56) (0.94) 
0.30       0.12 0.31** 0.13DIFFICULT 
HIRE (2.21)        (0.72) (2.35) (0.82)
 0.05  -0.34  0.08  -0.32 RISK  (0.32)  (1.45)  (0.53)  (1.40) 
0.34*** 0.47** 0.35*** 0.47**EARLY         (2.65) (2.45) (2.76) (2.48)
-0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.22* -0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.21* logCAPITAL (1.28) (1.21) (1.51) (1.66) (1.28) (1.19) (1.51) (1.64) 
-0.00        -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00DEALS (0.30)        (0.16) (0.26) (0.05) (0.39) (0.23) (0.29) (0.10)
0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** HIRINGS (4.62) (3.71) (3.53) (3.71) (4.60) (3.60) (3.49) (3.69) 
-2.50**        -1.96 -2.35* -1.39 -2.09*** -1.63 -1.81** -0.95CONSTANT (1.98)        (1.37) (1.87) (0.87) (2.17) (1.43) (1.96) (0.71)
N 56        55 56 55 56 55 56 55
Pseudo R2 0.15        0.11 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.18
LogLikelihood -74.09        -76.14 -72.87 -0.70 -74.54 -76.88 -73.25 -70.56
Wald χ2 26.30        20.20 28.74 31.37 25.39 18.72 27.97 30.64
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of  10, 5, and 1%  respectively (2-tailed) 
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TABLE 9 
Empirical Determinants of the Decision to Network: Suggesting Managers 
The dependent variable is the agreement to proposition SUGGESTS: It is common for me to suggest likely managers to others in the private equity business. 
Independent variables are described in Tables 1 and 5. Variable INFORMATION VALUE is the product of variables SPECIAL SKILLS and 
MANAGERIAL IMPACT. Estimates come from ordered probit analysis.  In parentheses are the regression coefficients’ z-values. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
0.00        0.01 0.03 0.00SPECIAL SKILLS (0.09)        (0.20) (0.41) (0.00)
-0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06     MANAGERIAL 
IMPACT (0.25) (0.54) (0.40) (0.37)     
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00INFORMATION 
VALUE         (0.10) (0.04) (0.29) (0.07)
0.49*** 0.47*** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.46*** REPUTATION (4.53) (4.33) (4.65) (4.16) (4.55) (4.40) (4.71) (4.20) 
0.12      0.15 0.12   0.15*DIFFICULT 
HIRE (1.31)        (1.58) (1.35) (1.64)
 0.22***  0.25**  0.22***  0.25** RISK  (2.73)  (2.16)  (2.72)  (2.16) 
0.13* -0.01 0.13* -0.01EARLY         (1.81) (0.13) (1.80) (0.13)
-0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 logCAPITAL (0.29) (0.23) (0.43) (0.08) (0.28) (0.22) (0.42) (0.09) 
N 144        142 144 142 144 142 144 142
Pseudo R2 0.07        0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09
LogLikelihood -159.96        -155.62 -159.17 -154.37 -159.99 -155.79 -159.29 -154.44
Wald χ2 25.99        29.84 27.56 32.33 25.93 29.50 27.33 32.20
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of  10, 5, and 1%  respectively (2-tailed) 
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TABLE 10 
Empirical Determinants of the Number of Managers Suggested to Non-Partners 
The dependent variable is the number of managers suggested to non-partners in the previous 5 years. Independent variables are described in Tables 1 and 5. 
Variable INFORMATION VALUE is the product of variables SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERIAL IMPACT. Estimates come from Poisson 
regressions.  In parentheses are the regression coefficients’ z-values. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
-0.28*** -0.14*       -0.16* -0.27***SPECIAL SKILLS (3.02)        (1.67) (1.87) (2.91)
-0.30*** -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.32***     MANAGERIAL 
IMPACT (3.73) (4.32) (4.05) (3.73)     
    -0.07***    -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.08***INFORMATION 
VALUE         (5.25) (4.60) (4.64) (5.13)
0.23** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.20* 0.25** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.23** REPUTATION (2.24) (2.62) (2.87) (1.91) (2.45) (2.86) (3.05) (2.20) 
0.40***      0.44*** 0.41*** 0.45***DIFFICULT 
HIRE (4.77)        (4.81) (5.08) (5.03)
 0.10  0.25*  0.12  0.25* RISK  (1.26)  (1.84)  (1.53)  (1.86) 
        0.10 -0.15 0.12* -0.14EARLY         (1.52) (1.33) (1.90) (1.29)
0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 -0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.08 logCAPITAL (0.28) (0.45) (1.24) (1.44) (0.02) (0.83) (1.61) (1.20) 
-0.01        -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02DEALS (1.29)        (0.21) (0.46) (1.10) (1.52) (0.30) (0.52) (1.39)
0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.01 0.03*** HIRINGS (3.17) (1.29) (1.48) (2.79) (3.08) (0.85) (1.10) (2.68) 
1.18*        2.06*** 2.38*** 0.09 0.05 0.98* 1.37*** -1.06CONSTANT (1.91)        (2.97) (4.05) (0.11) (0.11) (1.64) (2.86) (1.30)
N 50        49 50 49 50 49 50 49
Pseudo R2 0.19        0.12 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.20
LogLikelihood -137.43        -147.23 -148.22 -134.74 -136.39 -147.74 -148.14 -133.84
Wald χ2 68.68        41.97 47.10 66.95 70.77 40.95 47.27 68.75
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of  10, 5, and 1%  respectively (2-tailed) 
 
